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Abstract 
We examine  a) whether texts about predictive inferences that contain a high level of contextual constraints, that is, a high 
likelihood of dangerous outcomes (89%), facilitate drawing danger-related predictive inferences in high anxiety individuals; this 
would be a sign of a danger inferential bias, and b) whether such context constraints speed up the time course of predictive 
inferences and are produced automatically. Participants with  different levels of trait anxiety –high vs. low- read predictive 
contexts, which are danger-related and non-danger-related, and from which either a highly likely outcome or a non-predictable 
one can be inferred. In Experiment 1, the high-anxiety group drew more danger-related inferences than non-danger-ones, and the 
low-anxiety group made more non-danger-related inferences. In Experiment 2, with a 500 ms SOA interval between the inducing 
context of the inference and the target word confirming or disconfirming the predictable event, all participants made danger-
related inferences. Results demonstrate that high contextual constraints help high-anxiety individuals focus their resources on the 
most dangerous outcomes rather than on other harmless information and the former is then selected when answering. This shows 
an inferential bias linked to anxiety. However, although such constraints speed up the time course of predictive inferences, they 
do not produce an automatic bias.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There is extensive evidence of an interpretative bias in anxiety. This bias consists of individuals with a high level 
of anxiety systematically opting for the most threatening interpretation of a stimulus which is objectively ambiguous 
and capable of various interpretations compared to individuals with low anxiety levels (see reviews in Castillo, 
2010; MacLeod, 1999; Rusting, 1998; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). To test this interpretative 
bias, Calvo et al. have used ambiguous sentences to induce predictive inferences. Predictive inferences involve the 
anticipation of the most probable outcome of an event, based on the explicit information provided by the text and the 
individual’s general background knowledge (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986). In previous research, except those by 
Calvo and Castillo (2001a, b), the factor of contextual constraints has not been sufficiently considered, despite being 
a critical one in the generation of predictive inferences on-line during reading. Contextual constraints refer to how 
predictable a specific outcome is, as a function of the previous context. Contextual constraints and predictability 
refer to the same concept. Therefore, hereinafter, both words will be used indistinctly.  
In this study we investigated: a) whether high contextual constraints, estimated at 89%, facilitate the generation 
of threatening predictive inferences, especially in high anxiety individuals. This level of predictability corresponds 
to the percentage of subjects who inferred the most likely outcome that could result from an event, and b) whether 
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the time-course of such inferences is speeded up under such contextual constraint conditions. The relevance of our 
first objective is to test whether high contextual constraints imply a high prediction of threat-related information in 
anxiety. If confirmed, this would suggest a threatening inferential bias associated with anxiety. The higher the level 
of contextual constraints, the higher the salience of the event and, therefore more likely to be inferred. The reason is 
that by means of contextual constraints the number of probable outcomes is reduced and, therefore, the outcome 
with a higher probability of occurrence is more predictable. We expect that the above mentioned high contextual 
constraints involve a higher number of threatening inferences in high anxiety participants (i.e., a threatening bias) 
than neutral inferences. 
Results from the only research (Calvo & Castillo, 2001a, b) that up to now has studied the effects of contextual 
constraints on the probability of occurrence of predictive inferences in anxiety are unclear. As shown by the results, 
at 56% predictability (Calvo & Castillo, 2001b, Experiment 1), high anxiety individuals made threat-related 
inferences, but not of non-threat; the opposite occurred in low anxiety individuals; this suggests a threatening bias in 
high anxiety and a non-threatening bias in low anxiety. In contrast, at 89% predictability (Calvo & Castillo, 2001b, 
Experiment 2) there was no evidence of bias: both groups generated a similar number of threatening and non-
threatening inferences. At an intermediate level of predictability (82%), there was no evidence of bias either (Calvo 
& Castillo, 2001a, Experiment 2), but there was a non-significant trend in the threat-related information in high 
anxiety and also a non-threatening trend in low anxiety (Calvo & Castillo, 2001a, Experiment 3). Of these two 
studies, the latter one gives a better contrast with the present research, as both share the same time-intervals between 
the inducing context of inference and the probe (i.e., SOA 1000 ms and 500 ms). However, the level of contextual 
constraints or predictability has been increased in the present study  from 82% to 89%. Contextual constraints and 
SOA interval are two relevant factors in determining whether predictive inferences are generated on-line or not. In 
conclusion, establishing clearly the role played by this increase of contextual constraints in the occurrence of bias, is 
an issue where more research is needed. This study attempts to make a useful contribution to this area. 
Experiment 1 
This experiment examined whether high contextual constraints at 89% induce an inferential bias in high anxiety 
compared with low anxiety individuals. To obtain this level of contextual constraints the materials were manipulated 
by adding a particle or short expression in the inducing context sentence which constrained the number of 
alternatives and led to a high predictability of the most likely outcome. With this procedure, tests reached a level of 
89% of predictability that we call ―major predictability‖ (i.e., as we have said previously, the most likely outcome 
was predicted by 89% of subjects), with respect to the study by Calvo & Castillo (2001a) with a ―minor 
predictability‖ (i.e., 82% predictability). This increase in predictability was statistically significant, t(39) = 3.92, p < 
.01. Our hypothesis is that major predictability will induce an inferential bias in high anxiety compared with low 
anxiety individuals. In contrast, no difference will be observed between the generation of danger-related and neutral 
inferences in low anxiety.   
 
Method 
Participants and selection criteria. Thirty-two psychology undergraduates were selected from a normal group of 
82 students. In the pre-experimental phase, participants were administered (a) the trait scale of the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1982); and (b) the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale (SDS; Spanish version by Avila & Tomé, 1989) which  assesses the tendency to respond in a 
socially desirable way and to give a favourable impression of oneself in self-report measures.  With those students 
with the highest and the lowest in STAI scores and if they scored 20 or less in the SDS we formed two groups: high 
anxiety (M in STAI = 59.0; SD = 5.80) and low anxiety (M in STAI= 32.62; SD = 4.22), respectively. The difference 
between groups was significant (t (30) = 14.68, p < .0001). In order to boost the inferential bias, evaluative stress 
conditions were simulated at the beginning of the experimental session. 
Materials. 40 short texts were used, each one comprising (a) one predicting context sentence, (b) one control 
context sentence, (c) one disambiguating context sentence confirming the predicting event, and (d) one 
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disambiguating context sentence disconfirming such event. Each participant received one of the lists with 40 
experimental trials in a random order. Each trial included either the predicting sentence or the control, followed by 
the confirming sentence or the disconfirming one which could be inferred from the previous sentence. 
Design. A 2 (Trait anxiety: high vs. low) x 2 (Situation: dangerous vs. non-dangerous) x 2 (Context: predicting 
vs. control) x 2 (Target: confirming vs. disconfirming) factorial design was used. Anxiety was a between-subject 
factor; the others were within-subject variables.  
Apparatus and procedure. 6 PCs for material presentation and reaction time response collection, 6 voice-keys, 
and 6 tape-recorders for target word naming accuracy were used. Sentences were presented word-by-word, through 
an RSVP procedure and a fixed-pace mode. Each word was exposed for 300 ms plus 25 ms per letter; in addition, 
there was a 50 ms interval between words. The average exposure time of each word was 418 ms, except the pre-
target word that always appeared for 450 ms. After a 500 ms interval the first word appeared on the screen and was 
immediately followed by each of the words that made up the sentence. After a 1000 ms SOA interval, the target 
word appeared flanked by asterisks. Asterisks denoted the word to be named aloud, as soon as possible trying to 
prevent errors. A voice-key attached close to the participant’s mouth, and connected to the computer, registered the 
naming latency (i.e., time in milliseconds from the onset of the target word on the screen to the onset of the subject’s 
response). In addition, a tape-recorder registered the accuracy response. At the end of each trial, a recognition 
question was presented in order to ensure participants read comprehensively. Using this test, we attempted to make 
participants believe that the comprehension of explicit information was being examined, and this was supposed to 
prevent them from drawing inferences strategically.  
Results 
 
Preliminary analyses. In both Experiments 1 and 2 of this study, naming errors in the target word were less than 
2%, and did not vary significantly as a result of experimental conditions. Comprehension of explicit information was 
equivalent under all conditions.  
Overall ANOVA. Firstly, in both experiments, the naming latencies that were above or below 2.5 standard 
deviations (SD) from the mean were replaced by the participant’s mean score ± 2.5 SD. Using this procedure 1.5% 
of outlier scores were replaced. Then, naming latencies for correctly pronounced target words were analysed in a 2 
(anxiety: high vs. low) × 2 (type of situation: danger vs. non-danger) × 2 (context: predictive vs. control) × 2 (target: 
confirming vs. disconfirming) ANOVA. The main effects of context, F(1, 30) = 5.15, p < .05, and target, F(1, 30) = 
12.57, p < .01, were significant, with  shorter latency for predicting context (M = 655 ms) than for the control one 
(M = 678 ms), and for confirming target words (M = 648 ms) than disconfirming ones (M = 685 ms). These effects 
were qualified by their interaction, context × target: F(1, 30) = 17.29, p <.001, indicating a shorter latency in the 
predicting condition, relative to the control one, in the confirming words (M = 56 ms), and an equivalent latency in 
both context conditions in the disconfirming words (M = 9 ms).  
 In addition, a four-way interaction involved all factors, F(1, 30) = 3.92, p = .05. To decompose this four-
way interaction, the reaction time scores were transformed into activation scores and relative activation scores. 
Activation scores indicate the extent to which the target concept is activated after reading the predicting context, 
relative to the control context. Relative activation scores indicate the degree of activation of the confirming vs. 
disconfirming outcome. Activation scores were calculated by subtracting naming latencies for a target word in the 
control condition from those for the same word in the predicting condition (i.e., predicting — control). Then, 
separate planned contrasts for each combination of trait anxiety, type of situation and target were conducted with the 
following results: Participants high in anxiety, F(1, 30) = 14.51, p < .001, exhibited a facilitation in the targets that 
represented danger-related outcomes, and low in anxiety, F(1, 30) = 3.35, p = .07, only a trend. In contrast, only 
participants low in anxiety showed a facilitation in the targets that represented non-danger-related outcomes, F(1, 
30) = 2.88, p < .10. Furthermore, participants high in anxiety showed a higher relative activation (i.e., confirming 
target—disconfirming target) in the danger-related confirming targets than the disconfirming ones, F(1, 30) = 13.02, 
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p < .01. In contrast, for participants with low anxiety, the higher facilitation occurred in the confirming non-danger-
related targets, F(1, 30) = 4.62, p < .05.  
 
Discussion 
 
The results indicate a greater volume of danger-related predictive inferences than non-danger ones in persons 
with high anxiety. This supports our hypothesis of an inferential bias of danger associated with anxiety. In contrast, 
the greater volume of non-danger-related predictive inferences than neutral ones in low anxiety individuals is 
contrary to our predictions.  
High predictability conditions at 89% have resulted in a relevant contribution in two ways. First, by facilitating 
both types of inferences –danger-related and non-danger-related, and second, intensifying the specific quality of the 
predicted information, associated with each level of trait-anxiety; i.e., danger-related information in high anxiety and 
non-danger-related information in low anxiety. The dangerous information inferential bias that high anxiety 
individuals exhibit is consistent with prior research (Calvo & Castillo, 1997; Calvo, Eysenck, & Castillo, 1997; 
Hirsch & Mathews, 1997). Likewise, there is evidence of a preferential reaction towards innocuous information in 
low anxiety persons when other information implying a potential danger is also available (Calvo & Castillo, 1997; 
MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; Richards & French, 1992). However, in this case the evidence is not so strong, as the 
statistical trends did not reach significance in most of the studies. In any case, both sets of evidence, although 
relevant, do not allow a strict comparison with the present study, as contextual predictability was not taken into 
account.  
The results by Calvo & Castillo (2001b), in which the predictability level reached the same level as here, are of 
interest. The reason is that, contrary to our results, Calvo & Castillo (2001b) did not find evidence of bias. One 
plausible explanation for this inconsistency in results could be due to the different SOA used in each study -1500 ms 
in Calvo & Castillo (2001b) vs. 1000 ms in the present study. In the former SOA, participants had enough time to 
accomplish possible strategic elaborations before the target word appeared on screen to be named. In contrast, in the 
present study, the 1000 ms SOA could prevent or, at least, make such elaborations difficult. As a consequence, this 
resulted in high anxiety individuals focusing specifically on information which could imply danger, making this 
information more predictable and drawing the inferential bias of danger. This follows the normal tendency of these 
individuals to direct cognitive resources selectively towards information or cues concerning real or potential dangers 
(Williams et al., 1997).  
 
Experiment 2 
This experiment examined whether the inferential danger bias found in Experiment 1 could speed up and occur 
automatically. To accomplish this goal, the SOA interval was shortened to 500 ms vs. 1000 ms in Experiment 1. At 
present, there is no evidence that predictive inferences are generated at such short time intervals (e.g., Klin, 
Guzman, & Levine, 1999), but at longer time periods, equal to or above 1 second (Calvo & Castillo, 1997, 1998). 
Both the constructionist theory (Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994) and the minimalist hypothesis (Mckoon & 
Ratcliff, 1992) of inferential processing consider it unlikely that predictive inferences occur on-line, unless the 
information is very accessible to memory (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992), the reader's goals are implied and outcomes 
very constrained by context. Furthermore, if they occur, they would not be automatic, but strategic and elaborative 
(Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994). Taking into account these conditions, we examined whether  using texts in 
which the outcome to be inferred is highly predictable would facilitate high anxiety individuals to generate 
predictive inferences automatically. If true, the target words, which confirm the most likely event, would be named 
faster when presented after the predicting context than the control one, in comparison with the disconfirming target 
words, in this 500 ms SOA.  
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Method 
 
Participants. 32 psychology undergraduates were selected from a normal group of 98 students. 16 high-trait 
anxiety (M in STAI = 59.3, SD = 3.16) and 16 low-trait anxiety (M = 35.2, SD = 3.21), t(30) = 21.36, p < .0001. The 
same selection criteria were used as in Experiment 1. 
Procedure. The same materials, design and procedure as in Experiment 1 were used, except the SOA interval, 
which was set at 500 ms.  
Results 
 
Preliminary analyses. The percentage of correct comprehension questions was 84.5% (SD = 2.90) and 89.3% (SD 
= 2.26) in high and low anxiety participants, respectively. 
Overall ANOVA. In the 2 (anxiety: high vs. low) x 2 (situation: danger-related vs. non-danger-related) x 2 
(context: predicting vs. control) x 2 (target: confirming vs. disconfirming) ANOVA on the mean latency scores, the 
only significant effect was the interaction between situation by context by target, F(1, 30) = 4.52, p < .05. Planned 
contrasts conducted to decompose this interaction showed the following effects: both high anxiety individuals, F(1, 
30) = 6.26, p < .025, as well as low anxiety individuals, F(1,30) = 5.65, p < .025, had shorter latencies in naming the 
confirming words of danger in the predictive condition than in the control. In contrast, this facilitating effect was not 
found either in the confirming word of non-danger or in the disconfirming of danger or non-danger related. This 
demonstrates that, regardless of anxiety level, the majority of participants made predictive inferences of danger, but 
not of non-danger. Such an interpretation is strengthened by the fact that in both groups of anxiety –high: F(1, 30)  = 
3.65, p =.05; low: F(1, 30) = 5.08, p < .05- a relative facilitation was found when naming the confirming targets of 
danger-related compared with disconfirming ones. In contrast, this effect did not emerge in the confirming targets of 
non-danger information. 
Discussion 
 
Danger-related predictive inferences, but not non-danger inferences, are drawn automatically, as these 
elaborations are generated at a 500 ms SOA. Furthermore, this phenomenon emerges in all subjects regardless of 
their anxiety level, as revealed by the interaction between situation by context by target which confirms or 
disconfirms the most predictable outcome induced by context. These results are new with respect to prior studies 
related to predictive inferences and anxiety (e.g., Calvo & Castillo, 1998) and regarding lower contextual 
predictability conditions (Calvo & Castillo, 2001a). In no cases have predictive inferences been found within the 
first 500 ms after the inducing context; up till now, a one- second interval has always been necessary for these 
inferences to be drawn (Calvo & Castillo, 1996, 1998). Present results, however, support the idea that major 
predictability conditions speed up the time course of danger-related predictive inferences, and they are drawn at the 
initial processing stages, which suggests that these inferences are automatic. However, the high level of 
predictability of the targeted event does not affect the bias time course in anxiety, in the sense that the bias occurs 
automatically. This is demonstrated by the fact that both groups of anxiety are more likely to infer harmful or 
dangerous outcomes of events than neutral ones. If this level of predictability had affected the time course of bias, 
then only high, but not low anxious participants should have exhibited a tendency towards danger-related outcomes, 
whereas, in fact, the present results show that both anxiety groups exhibited tendencies towards danger prediction.  
 
General Discussion 
The main results of this study are: 1) In conditions of major predictability, data provide evidence of inferential 
biases, differentiated in content, associated with each level of trait anxiety: a danger-related bias associated with 
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high anxiety and a non-danger-related bias associated with low anxiety. In addition, the danger-related inferential 
bias found in the high anxiety group in Experiment 1 becomes more generalized in Experiment 2, as all participants, 
independent of their anxiety level, were more likely to infer dangerous outcomes of events than neutral ones. 2) Our 
data show that high predictability do not speed up the time course of the inferential bias in anxiety. Proof is that with 
a 500 ms SOA interval, within which it is assumed that automatic processes occur, all participants infer more 
danger-related outcomes than neutral ones. To produce the danger-related bias, the facilitation in the confirming 
danger target should occur only in high anxiety participants and not in all of them.These results are consistent with 
the suggestions of several authors (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Matthews & Harley, 1996; Wells & Mathews, 1994) 
that the interpretative bias in anxiety does not depend on automatic processes, but strategic and elaborative ones 
which occur after the meaningful access of the stimulus 
The danger-related inferential bias in high anxiety individuals (Experiment 1) is in accordance with previous 
research.  It is also congruent with the theoretical approaches of the most relevant cognitive models of anxiety (i.e., 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997) according to them, in information 
with high danger cues (e.g., 89% of danger predictability) high anxiety persons will allocate their resources towards 
the threat, showing a special vigilance versus danger. Our data confirm this phenomenon with a task that involves 
understanding the situation described in texts and inferring the most likely outcome in a brief time (milliseconds).  
The non-danger related inferential bias in low anxiety individuals (Experiment 1) coincides with previous studies 
(Calvo & Castillo, 1997; MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; Richards & French, 1992), and is also congruent with the model 
put forward by Williams et al. (1997), but not with proposals by Mathews & Mackintosh (1998) and Mogg & 
Bradley (1998; see explanation later). 
The important role that high predictability plays is demonstrated in the low anxiety group in Experiment 2, with 
the same predictive pattern –a danger-related bias- as the high anxiety group. This finding is the main contribution 
that this study makes. We note that such a bias of danger, first, occurs specifically at 500ms SOA and, second, could 
have implications for the cognitive models of anxiety (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Williams et al., 1997). This first aspect could be explained by jointly considering the intensity of danger or threat 
that the information represents and the available time to analyze it. That is, when the intensity of harmful cues is 
high or, as in our texts, the predictability of danger is high (89%) and there is just a short time to analyze it (500 ms 
SOA), only a vague or very general exploration of stimulus is possible. In such circumstances, the information that 
seems to be initially activated in the memory of all participants is that concerning danger, probably due to the 
pernicious implications for the survival of the organism. In contrast, the high volume of predictive inferences do  not 
occur when there is sufficient time to analyze the stimulus in detail –e.g., 1000 ms SOA, Experiment 1-, in which 
the specific biases as a function of anxiety are shown: danger-related bias in high anxiety and non-danger-related 
bias in low anxiety. The subcortical path (thalamus-amygdale) and the cortical path (thalamus-cortex-amygdale) 
studied by LeDoux (1992) could be responsible for these phenomena. 
The danger-related bias found in the low anxiety group (Experiment 2), to our way of thinking, can have relevant 
implications for the real anxiety models (i.e., Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et 
al., 1997). All these models coincide in putting forward that anxiety induces a preferential bias when the danger-
related information is processed with respect to positive or neutral information. The discrepancies between models 
arises when the stimulus danger increases, either because the danger objectively increases or due to a higher level of 
anxiety. In such circumstances, models predict different effects, such as the way  anxious persons assess such 
increases in danger and in the direction they allocate their processing resources. More specifically, when there are 
great danger cues, models coincide in that high anxiety persons will assess the stimulus as ―strong danger‖ and will 
allocate their cognitive resources in the direction of the threat, showing a danger-related vigilance bias. Our results 
in the high anxiety group support this idea. In contrast, the theoretical predictions concerning low anxiety when 
facing high danger-related cues are different. For Williams et al’s (1997) model these persons will allocate their 
resources away from the danger and will show an avoidance threat bias; in contrast, Mathews & Mackintosh (1998) 
and Mogg & Bradley (1998) state these resources will be allocated in the direction of the threat, and will show a 
vigilance threat bias, the same as in high-anxiety. Under such dangerous conditions, if low anxiety individuals 
attempted to avoid the processing of this information, instead of demonstrating special vigilance, the development of 
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proper behavioural strategies for coping would be prevented and, consequently, their responses would become 
maladaptive (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). These predictions concerning the attention bias can also be applied to 
the interpretative bias, as anxiety induces a priority for processing dangerous information in both biases. 
Furthermore, both biases are produced by the same process – mainly by an increase of activation of a system of 
threat assessment- (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998, p. 557). Consequently, it seems logical that the basic postulates 
of these models imply both, the attention and the interpretative biases.  
In accordance with these theoretical considerations, the inferential bias of danger in low anxiety persons in the 
present study is coherent with models put forward by Mathews & Mackintosh (1998) and Mogg & Bradley (1998). 
It supports the idea that as the extent of inferring dangerous events increases, it is more probable that low anxiety 
individuals allocate their resources towards such events, showing a vigilance bias, the same as in high anxiety 
individuals. In predictive terms, this vigilance bias is demonstrated by a greater likelihood of inferring danger-
related outcomes than neutral ones. High levels of predictability in danger-related and high harm cues in stimuli are 
conceptually comparable.  
For Williams et al. (1997), this vigilance bias in low anxiety presents, at first, some problems to explain. These 
individuals, according to their predictions, should have shown an avoidance bias instead of a vigilance one. 
However, avoidance does not make non-viable vigilance; both biases can be produced in low anxiety, although the 
necessary threat level for each one can be different. In this sense, as we have suggested in another paper (Calvo & 
Castillo, 2001b), the aforementioned models could be more complementary than opposite. That is, vigilance and 
avoidance biases are equally possible in low anxiety. The support for this idea is having found the boundary line 
between them, which had not been possible to fix in prior studies. There was evidence of an avoidance bias at 56% 
predictability (Calvo & Castillo, 2001b, Experiment 1), a non significant trend towards avoidance at 82% (Calvo & 
Castillo, 2001 a) and no bias at 89% (Calvo & Castillo, 2001b, Experiment 2). The present results, in contrast, 
provide evidence of a danger-related vigilance bias at 89% predictability. This suggests two issues: a) the boundary 
between avoidance and vigilance is set at 89% predictability, at least in situations about predictions of physical 
dangers similar to those our texts describe. Obviously, this boundary can vary in the case of real threats. And b) both 
biases (vigilance and avoidance) can occur in low anxiety, although the probability of the evidence is higher for the 
vigilance bias than the avoidance one and, in both cases, at a higher level than in high anxiety.   
In relation with inferential processing, the occurrence of automatically danger predictive inferences in this study 
is also a new result in the research. As far as we know, only one study (Linderholm, 2002) has found evidence of 
automatically predictive inferences in highly constrained conditions, in which individuals with high capacity 
working memory and highly constrained texts were used. In contrast, she found negative results in low capacity 
working memory individuals. The present study broadens the conditions that make these elaborations possible 
during the first stage of processing. The emotional factors, like the reactivity in anxious individuals, the stress 
conditions, and the emotionally meaningful content of materials have all demonstrated an important role in drawing 
these inferences. Now it is necessary to add a high level in contextual constraints or predictability. The combination 
of emotional factors and high level of constraints facilitate not only a higher volume of inferences, but also enable 
these to occur in the initial stage of processing (i.e., automatically). The constructionist theory and the minimalist 
hypothesis provide the basis for these conditions. In summary, high contextual constraints, which induce predictive 
inferences, raises the probability of these elaborations occurring, speeds up the time course of danger-related 
inferences, but does not speed up the time course of the inferential bias in anxiety. 
From our perspective, several pending issues must be addressed in future studies: a) New material must be used 
with the same level of 89% of  predictability as this study to confirm that this level is the limit between vigilance 
and avoidance of danger. b) The (un-) stable character of such boundary. That is, whether it remains stable or, in 
contrast, suffers some modification, and in such case, the direction the bias takes: in the direction of threat or away 
from it when individuals cope with potential harms different from those used here, for example, ego threatening, 
interpersonal or involving wider social contexts.  
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